Research on panic spread and decision behaviour in a delayed SEIR evolutionary game model under an emergency

Area of Science:

• Social Sciences
• Game Theory
• Epidemiology

Background:

• Major emergencies can trigger widespread panic.
• Understanding panic transmission and decision-making is crucial.

Purpose of the Study:

• To explore panic spread mechanisms and opinion field decision behavior during emergencies.
• To model the evolutionary game dynamics between official and public opinion fields.

Main Methods:

• Utilized evolutionary game theory to analyze interactions between official and public opinion fields.
• Introduced a dependence coefficient to improve replicator dynamics, accounting for strategy dependency.
• Developed a dynamic delayed SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered) evolutionary game model, integrating epidemic modeling with group delay effects.

Main Results:

• Strategy dependency within game groups exhibits both positive and negative influences on panic evolution.
• Simulations of the dynamic delayed panic SEIR model demonstrate the impact of positive strategy dependency effects.
• The model's stability was analyzed, providing insights into panic spread dynamics.

Conclusions:

• Official and public opinion fields must proactively manage emergencies.
• Effective control strategies are needed to mitigate panic.
• The research offers theoretical guidance for government emergency planning and public opinion management.