Social networks and voter turnout

Area of Science:

• Political Science
• Sociology
• Network Theory

Background:

• The calculus of voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) provides a foundational framework for understanding voter turnout.
• Existing models often overlook the significant impact of social connections on individual voting decisions.
• Puzzles in voter turnout, including income disparities and prediction difficulties, remain incompletely explained.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a novel model of voter turnout that incorporates social network structures.
• To analyze how social contacts affect the expressive benefits individuals derive from voting.
• To explore the implications of network structure for multiple voting equilibria.

Main Methods:

• Development of a mathematical model integrating Riker and Ordeshook's calculus of voting with social network analysis.
• Analysis of how individual voting decisions are influenced by the behavior of social contacts within the network.
• Examination of the relationship between network structure and the emergence of multiple equilibria.

Main Results:

• The model demonstrates that social network structure significantly impacts voter turnout equilibria.
• Individual expressive benefits from voting are shown to be contingent on the actions of social contacts.
• Multiple equilibria in voter turnout are possible, determined by the configuration of the social network.

Conclusions:

• Social network structure is a critical determinant of voter turnout patterns and equilibria.
• The model offers new explanations for long-standing puzzles in political science, such as income-related turnout differences and voter inertia.
• Understanding social influence within networks is key to predicting and potentially influencing voter participation.