Relational care and epistemic injustice

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Medicine
• Primary Care Ethics
• Social Epistemology

Background:

• Previous work established a relational view of autonomy suited for primary care.
• The current analysis extends this by integrating theories of human suffering and epistemic injustice.

Purpose of the Study:

• To further develop the philosophical underpinnings of primary care.
• To demonstrate the integral role of relationships in ethical practice and ameliorating epistemic injustice.
• To argue for the necessity of addressing epistemic injustice for personalized care.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis integrating relational autonomy theory with concepts of human suffering and epistemic injustice.
• Critical examination of existing normative ethical frameworks in primary care.

Main Results:

• Relational care is fundamental to mitigating epistemic injustice.
• Ethical practice in primary care is intrinsically linked to therapeutic relationships.
• Personalized care, as envisioned in the NHS Long Term Plan, is unattainable without addressing epistemic injustice.

Conclusions:

• Revisiting normative ethical frameworks is crucial for effective primary care.
• Addressing epistemic injustice is a prerequisite for achieving genuinely personalized patient care.
• The philosophical foundations of primary care must evolve to encompass relational and epistemic considerations.