A fish cartel for Africa

Area of Science:

• Marine resource economics
• Fisheries management
• International trade

Background:

• African coastal waters are biologically rich but under-monetized from fishing rights sales.
• African nations individually negotiate fishing access, lacking collective market power.
• Foreign nations and fishers exploit these resources, often with greater returns.

Purpose of the Study:

• To model the economic and ecological impacts of an African fishing cartel.
• To assess the potential benefits of collective bargaining power in fisheries.
• To explore solutions for enhancing African nations' revenue from fishing rights.

Main Methods:

• Development of a bilateral oligopoly model.
• Simulation of a hypothetical African fish cartel.
• Analysis of market power dynamics between African sellers and foreign buyers.

Main Results:

• A cartel would lead to restricted catch, increasing fish biomass by 16%.
• African nations would see average profit increases of 23% due to shifted market power.
• Collective action significantly improves economic returns and ecological sustainability.

Conclusions:

• Forming a fishing cartel offers substantial economic and ecological advantages for African countries.
• Deeper African integration is a viable strategy to address economic and environmental challenges in fisheries.
• Overcoming individual negotiation disadvantages can unlock greater value from marine resources.