Tripartite evolutionary game study on coordination information security in prescription circulation

Area of Science:

• Health Policy
• Information Security
• Game Theory

Background:

• Reforming healthcare systems requires regulating multi-level treatment and rationalizing medicine use.
• Securing prescription circulation information is vital for efficient healthcare delivery.
• Understanding player behavior in information security collaboration is essential.

Purpose of the Study:

• To explore the evolutionary behavior of hospitals, retail pharmacies, and healthcare platforms regarding information security collaboration.
• To analyze evolutionary paths and parameter influences within a tripartite evolutionary game model.
• To provide policy recommendations for secure prescription circulation.

Main Methods:

• Construction of a tripartite evolutionary game model involving hospitals, retail pharmacies, and healthcare service platforms.
• Analysis of evolutionary paths and outcomes based on varying parameters.
• Simulation analysis to support theoretical findings.

Main Results:

• Increased information security costs reduce hospital collaboration willingness but enhance platform regulation.
• Higher profitability of prescription sales can decrease collaborative efforts; increased collaboration space improves security.
• A bidirectional constraint exists between circulation and control subjects; shorter tech spillover time from platforms boosts security.
• Early-stage external regulation by healthcare platforms is crucial for information security coordination.

Conclusions:

• Findings offer countermeasures for government to realize prescription circulation information security collaboration.
• Optimizing cost-benefit structures and fostering inter-entity collaboration are key.
• Platform regulation and rapid technology integration are vital for secure prescription data management.