Minimal self-consciousness and the flying man argument

Area of Science:

• Phenomenology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• The minimal self, or basic self-awareness, is crucial for understanding ownership, agency, and self-disorders like schizophrenia.
• Current definitions of the minimal self lack precision, necessitating further conceptual clarification.
• This concept is relevant to diverse fields, including Buddhist philosophy and the study of illusions.

Purpose of the Study:

• To define and clarify the concept of the minimal self.
• To explore the relationship between the minimal self, bodily awareness, and sensory processes.
• To re-examine contemporary debates on the minimal self through a historical lens.

Main Methods:

• Historical analysis of Avicenna's 11th-century Flying Man argument.
• Review of contemporary philosophical and scientific literature on the minimal self.
• Conceptual analysis linking phenomenology, bodily self-awareness, and sentience.

Main Results:

• The minimal self is characterized as pre-reflective, first-person self-awareness, encompassing bodily and phenomenal experience.
• Avicenna's Flying Man argument offers a valuable framework for understanding the minimal self's connection to embodiment.
• Contemporary discussions highlight the integral role of bodily and social factors in minimal self-consciousness.

Conclusions:

• A clearer definition of the minimal self is proposed, emphasizing its foundational role in subjective experience.
• The study underscores the importance of integrating historical insights with current research on embodiment and self-awareness.
• Further research is needed to fully elucidate the complex interplay of bodily, sensory, and social factors in minimal self-consciousness.