Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism

Altruism and spite are costly to the actor, making their evolution unlikely without specific mechanisms. Nonetheless, both altruistic and spiteful behaviors are present in individuals, which suggests the existence of an underlying mechanism that drives their evolution. If altruistic individuals are more likely to be recipients of altruism than non-altruistic individuals, then altruism can be favored by natural selection. Similarly, if spiteful individuals are less likely to be recipients of spite than non-spiteful individuals, then spite can be favored by natural selection. Spite is altruism's evil twin, ugly sister of altruism, or a shady relative of altruism. In some mechanisms, such as repeated interactions, if altruism is favored by natural selection, then spite is also favored by natural selection. However, there has been limited investigation into whether both behaviors evolve to the same extent. In this study, we focus on the mechanism by which individuals choose to keep or stop the interaction according to the opponent's behavior. Using the evolutionary game theory, we investigate the evolution of altruism and spite under this mechanism. Our model revealed that the evolution of spite is less likely than the evolution of altruism.