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Published on: October 20, 2022
Variance, norms and cooperative behavior in public goods games
Guangrong Wang1,2, Jianbiao Li2,3, Wenhua Wang2,3
1Neural Decision Science Laboratory, School of Economics and Management, Weifang University, Weifang, China.
High contribution variance in public goods games reduces cooperation and social norm adherence. Even deviations from the mean negatively impact social appropriateness, with social norms having no significant mediating effect.
Area of Science:
- Behavioral Economics
- Social Psychology
Background:
- Cooperative behavior is crucial for societal functioning.
- Understanding factors influencing cooperation, such as social norms and group dynamics, is essential.
- Distribution heterogeneity, or variance in contributions, is an understudied aspect of cooperative behavior.
Purpose of the Study:
- To investigate the relationship between the variance of others' contributions, social norms (empirical and normative expectations), and cooperative behavior.
- To determine the impact of contribution variance on individual contributions and social norm perceptions.
- To explore the mediating role of social norms in the relationship between variance and cooperation.
Main Methods:
- Utilized a classic linear public goods game experiment.
- Measured participants' contributions, empirical expectations, and normative expectations.
- Analyzed the impact of the variance in group members' contributions on individual behavior and perceptions.
Main Results:
- Increased variance in group members' contributions negatively affected individual contributions, empirical expectations, and normative expectations.
- Deviations from the mean contribution, both positive and negative, were perceived as less socially appropriate.
- A strong relationship was observed between variance, social norms, and cooperation, but social norms did not significantly mediate this relationship.
- Free riders and cooperators showed distinct behavioral patterns but similar normative expectations; free riders had lower empirical expectations than cooperators.
Conclusions:
- Contribution variance is a significant factor influencing cooperative behavior and social norm perceptions in public goods games.
- Social norms do not fully mediate the effect of variance on cooperation, suggesting other mechanisms at play.
- Understanding the distinct expectations of different behavioral types (e.g., free riders vs. cooperators) is key to comprehending group dynamics and informing management practices.
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