Reciprocity models revisited: intention factors and reference values

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Game Theory
• Social Psychology

Background:

• Reciprocity is a key factor in economic decision-making.
• Established models include the intention factor and reference value models.
• Understanding these models is crucial for predicting fairness and cooperation.

Purpose of the Study:

• To empirically test the predictive accuracy of two prominent reciprocity models.
• To identify discrepancies between theoretical predictions and actual human behavior in economic games.
• To explore potential refinements or alternative models for explaining observed behavior.

Main Methods:

• Conducting twelve mini-ultimatum games via online experiments.
• Systematically varying offer amounts and game parameters.
• Comparing experimental results against predictions from the intention factor and reference value models.

Main Results:

• The reference value model's prediction of "kindness" based on offer distance was inaccurate.
• The intention factor model's predictions became indistinguishable in more complex scenarios.
• Significant deviations were observed between actual participant behavior and both established models.

Conclusions:

• Neither the intention factor nor the reference value model adequately explains observed behavior in mini-ultimatum games.
• Existing models may require modification, potentially by combining elements from both.
• Further research is needed to develop more robust models of reciprocity in economic interactions.