Will psychology ever 'join hands' with disability studies? Opportunities and challenges in working towards...

Despite sustained efforts among critically informed scholars to integrate thinking from disability studies into psychology, the psy disciplines continue to largely neglect the lived experience of disabled people and overlook disability as a form of social inequity and valued culture. In this article, I make a renewed case for integrating thinking from disability studies into psy, in particular within the psychotherapy professions and in the case of 'energy limiting conditions', a grass-roots concept that includes clinically and socially marginalised chronic illness such as Long COVID. Drawing on my experience as a disabled practitioner, and situating this within extant literature on disability and psy, I take an autoethnographic approach to exploring opportunities and challenges in bridging the interdisciplinary divide. I argue that unacknowledged institutional ableism within psy reproduces and is reinforced by physical and attitudinal barriers for disabled practitioners and service users, engendering under-representation of disability in psychotherapy professions and lacunae in disability-affirmative conceptual resources. Additionally, I propose that hermeneutical lacunae are bolstered by documented defensive clinical practices pertaining to disability. After discussing a wealth of opportunities for integration offered by disability studies, and noting the institutional failure within psy to embrace disability-related demographic and epistemic diversity, I question whether ongoing epistemic and social exclusions within the psy disciplines constitute a case of 'willful epistemic ableism'. Drawing on theorising vis-à-vis epistemic injustice and epistemologies of ignorance, I signal a form of systematic, actively maintained and structurally incentivised (motivated) non-knowing that results in collective failure among dominant groups to recognise established hermeneutical resources of the disabled community and allies. I conclude with suggestions of how this form of epistemic injustice might be mitigated.