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Published on: December 9, 2012
A study of the evolutionary game of carbon offset involving tourism stakeholders under incentive and constraint
Qianna Li1,2, Changjiang Xiong3, Juan Yao2
1College of Economics and Management, Neijiang Normal University, Neijiang, 641000, China.
Abstract:
Tourism carbon offsetting is a crucial pathway to achieving peak carbon and carbon neutrality in the tourism industry. Accurately grasping the collaborative evolutionary mechanisms among local governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists is key to promoting the implementation of tourism carbon offsetting. By constructing an evolutionary game model involving local governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists in carbon offsetting, this study uses MATLAB to simulate the evolutionary stable strategies under various conditions. Additionally, it dynamically simulates the collaborative strategies of the three parties under the influence of local government incentive and constraint mechanisms. The results indicate that under strong governmental constraint mechanisms, there is a promotion of active participation in carbon offsetting by local governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists. Incentive policies at certain levels also play a positive guiding role. As incentives increase, local subsidies and intervention costs also rise, leading to an evolution towards less enthusiastic participation among the three parties. Appropriately balanced government incentives and penalties are beneficial in achieving an equilibrium of benefits among multiple stakeholders involved in carbon offsetting, thus helping to attain carbon neutrality goals.
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