The Limits to Food and Beverage Industry Influence over Fiscal and Regulatory Policy in Latin America

Little is known about the political, institutional, and social contexts contributing to a decline in food and beverage industry power and influence over fiscal policy (soda taxes) and regulatory policy (sales/advertising restrictions and food labels). This article addresses this issue by exploring why Mexico and Chile eventually saw such a decline in the food and beverage industry's influence, whereas a similar decline did not occur in Brazil. The article argues that in Mexico and Chile, these outcomes are explained by presidential, congressional, and bureaucratic interests shifting to pursue policies that went against industry preferences.

This article took a qualitative methodological approach to comparative historical research.

Policy makers' interest in pursuing stronger food and beverage regulations were shaped by economic and public health concerns, new electoral contexts, epidemiological information, and normative beliefs. In Mexico, the infiltration of nutrition researchers within government facilitated this process. By contrast, Brazil's government was divided about pursuing regulatory policies, with presidents favoring partnerships with industry to implement a popular antihunger program; industry's power endured there with limited progress in policy reforms.

Governments can eventually overcome industry power and policy influence, but it depends on a whole-government commitment to reform.