Making sense of feelings

Area of Science:

• Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind
• Animal Behavior

Background:

• The traditional view posits that internal feelings (e.g., pain, hunger) directly drive behaviors crucial for survival and homeostasis.
• This 'causal assumption' faces challenges reconciling with modern neuroscience's understanding of motor action and the brain's explanatory gap.
• An alternative perspective is needed to understand the function of subjective experiences without resorting to epiphenomenalism.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the conventional 'causal assumption' regarding the function of internal feeling states.
• To propose a novel framework, the 'sense-making sense' hypothesis, for understanding subjective experience.
• To integrate neural computations, motor control, and feelings within a coherent explanatory model.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of the relationship between feelings, behavior, and neuroscience.
• Development of the 'sense-making sense' hypothesis as an alternative to the causal assumption.
• Integration of established neural computation models with theories of subjective experience and motor control.

Main Results:

• Demonstrates the incompatibility of the 'causal assumption' with current neuroscience models of motor action.
• Introduces the 'sense-making sense' hypothesis, proposing that subjective experience functions as a form of restricted explanation.
• Presents a framework integrating neural processes for motor control, feelings, and explanatory functions.

Conclusions:

• Internal feeling states may not directly cause behavior but serve an explanatory role in how organisms make sense of their actions.
• The 'sense-making sense' hypothesis offers a functional account of subjective experience compatible with evolutionary biology.
• This research provides a new perspective on the integration of feelings into our understanding of action and motivation.