Multistakeholder Initiatives and Sustainability? A Governance Analysis using the German Initiative on Sustainable...

This paper examines the Multistakeholder initiative (MSI) "German Initiative on Sustainable Cocoa (GISCO)". MSIs represent arenas in which heterogeneous actors from governments, businesses and civil society come together to achieve sustainability goals that they cannot achieve otherwise. The self-defined goals of GISCO are first, to improve the living conditions of cocoa farmers and their families; second, to conserve and protect natural resources and biodiversity; and third, to increase the share of sustainably produced cocoa. Although all stakeholder groups share these goals, they have different agendas and conflicting interests. Despite numerous case studies, no theoretical basis has been established on the functioning and success of negotiations in MSIs. Therefore, the question arises as to how the governance of an MSI can be captured empirically to explain (un)achieved outcomes of the collaboration. The contribution of this paper is the development of a theoretical framework and its application to the case study. Minutes of 84 meetings and 18 qualitative expert interviews were analyzed by social network analysis and qualitative content analysis using MaxQDA to identify (a) influential actors, (b) collaboration structures and (c) processes as well as (d) topics discussed to explain (not) achieved outcomes regarding the self-defined goals. The results provide detailed insight into the governance of an MSI. The MSI helps members to extend their individual networks and to learn from each other, but quickly reaches its limits in achieving the self-imposed common goals. One reason for this is the lack of representation of actors from the Global South, despite addressing environmental and living conditions there in two out of the three GISCO goals. Furthermore, it is shown that the structures and processes of decision-making within the MSI are designed in such a way that a lack of hierarchical directives, sanctions and other decision-making mechanisms makes negotiation-based compromises difficult. Consequently, the power of each stakeholder group to use their veto right to delay or prevent the changes required to achieve common goals cannot be overcome.