Social Rationality and Human Reasoning: Logical Expressivism and the Flat Mind

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Science
• Philosophy of Mind
• Epistemology

Background:

• The flat mind hypothesis posits the mind comprises inconsistent experiential fragments.
• Formal epistemology defines rationality through belief consistency and logical consequence adherence.
• Reconciling these views presents a challenge for understanding human rationality.

Purpose of the Study:

• To reconcile the "flat mind" hypothesis with traditional accounts of rationality.
• To propose a social account of rationality based on logical expressivism.
• To explore the implications of this social account for cognitive science and epistemology.

Main Methods:

• Development of a social account of rationality inspired by logical expressivism.
• Analysis of rationality within public, dialogical contexts rather than private belief systems.
• Examination of the interaction between fragmented knowledge and social distribution of rationality.

Main Results:

• Rationality is redefined in terms of public commitments and the acknowledgment of logical norms.
• Individual belief inconsistency does not automatically equate to irrationality.
• It can be rational to not resolve contradictions under certain social conditions.

Conclusions:

• The mind can be "flat" (fragmented and inconsistent) yet highly rational.
• A social expressivist framework offers a novel perspective on rationality.
• This approach has implications for dual process theories, belief status, and cognitive systems.