Beyond a binary theorizing of prosociality

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Game Theory
• Social Psychology

Background:

• Human cooperation in public goods games exceeds predictions from economic rationality.
• Two hypotheses explain this: innate prosocial preference or a confused learner effect during game acquisition.

Purpose of the Study:

• To empirically distinguish between the prosocial preference and confused learner hypotheses.
• To investigate the impact of persistent cooperators ('zealots') on human cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Main Methods:

• Utilized large-scale experimental data from the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma, a variant of the public goods game.
• Manipulated the presence of 'zealots' (bots programmed for persistent cooperation) and participant awareness of them.

Main Results:

• Confirmed a prosocial bias in human participants, but it does not lead to a complete disregard for personal profit.
• Observed a significant cooperative response when participants were aware of or interacted with zealots.
• Findings indicate a more nuanced understanding of human cooperation than previously theorized.

Conclusions:

• Human cooperation is influenced by a prosocial bias, moderated by self-interest and environmental cues like persistent cooperators.
• The study moves beyond simplistic explanations of prosociality, highlighting the complexity of cooperative decision-making.
• The positive response to zealots has practical implications for designing policies that encourage cooperation.