Functions of consciousness in emotional processing

Contrary to the leading theories of consciousness on offer, it is a fruitful working hypothesis that conscious experiences facilitate a variety of functional capacities that are distinct to particular psychological tasks, individuals, and species (i.e., functional pluralism). In this paper, I illustrate this novel methodological point by identifying some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) emotional processing. I first consolidate empirical evidence of the capacities and limitations of unconscious emotional processing, drawing on a) experimental paradigms that employ the tools of vision science (masking and suppression of emotionally relevant stimuli), and b) theoretical and clinical research on emotional disorder (Generalized Anxiety Disorder). After comparing the functional characteristics of unconscious and conscious emotional processes, I argue that conscious experiences facilitate a cluster of functions that are specific to emotion, including increased capacities for representing fine-grained evaluative information, inhibition, and flexible response.