Concept-formation and deep disagreements in theoretical and practical reasoning

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Epistemology
• Ethics

Background:

• Deep disagreements challenge rational consensus in both theoretical and practical domains.
• Existing accounts often overlook the foundational role of concept formation in reasoning disputes.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a novel account of deep disagreements rooted in clashing paradigms of basic reasoning concepts.
• To demonstrate how concept indeterminacy fuels intractable disputes.
• To offer a Wittgensteinian perspective on the nature of reasoning.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of reasoning and concept formation.
• Examination of the normative structure imposed by linguistic concepts.
• Case studies of deep disagreements concerning "evidence" and "fairness".

Main Results:

• Deep disagreements stem from divergent paradigms of "basic concepts" essential for reasoning.
• The indeterminacy of concept formation, particularly in moral contexts, exacerbates these disagreements.
• Theoretical and practical reasoning disputes share a common root in clashing concept paradigms.

Conclusions:

• The proposed account offers a unified explanation for deep disagreements across different reasoning types.
• Understanding concept formation is key to addressing intractable disputes.
• This framework avoids moral relativism despite acknowledging concept indeterminacy.