Impact of correlated information on pioneering decisions

Normative models are often used to describe how humans and animals make decisions. These models treat deliberation as the accumulation of uncertain evidence that terminates with a commitment to a choice. When extended to social groups, such models often assume that individuals make independent observations. However, individuals typically gather evidence from common sources, and their observations are rarely independent. Here we ask: For a group of ideal observers who do not exchange information, what is the impact of correlated evidence on decision accuracy? We show that even when agents are identical, correlated evidence causes decision accuracy to depend on temporal decision order. The first decider is less accurate than a lone observer, and early deciders are less accurate than late deciders. These phenomena occur despite the fact that the rational observers use the same decision criterion, so they are equally confident in their decisions. We analyze discrete and macroscopic evidence-gathering models to explain why the first decider is less accurate than a lone observer when evidence is correlated. Pooling the decisions of early deciders using a majority rule does not rescue accuracy results in only a modest accuracy gain. Although we analyze an idealized model, we believe that our analysis offers insights that do not depend on exactly how groups integrate evidence and form decisions.