Belief beyond reason: a radical relativist hinge epistemology

Area of Science:

• Epistemology
• Philosophy of Mind
• Social Epistemology

Background:

• Hinge epistemology is often criticized for its relativist and non-evidentialist implications.
• Existing defenses of hinge epistemology (Ashton, 2019; Pritchard, 2016) offer partial solutions to these concerns.
• Radical skeptical problems, particularly those based on closure principles, pose a persistent challenge in epistemology.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop and advocate for an explicitly relativist and radically non-evidentialist version of hinge epistemology.
• To demonstrate how this radical relativist hinge epistemology (RR) can dissolve closure-based radical skeptical problems.
• To establish RR as a form of social hinge epistemology applicable to issues like deep disagreement and injustice.

Main Methods:

• Synthesizing Ashton's (2019) relativist hinge epistemology with Pritchard's (2016) non-epistemic reading of hinge commitments.
• Developing arguments for a radically non-evidentialist stance within hinge epistemology.
• Applying the developed framework to analyze social phenomena such as deep disagreement, testimonial injustice, and hermeneutic injustice.

Main Results:

• A coherent framework for radical relativist hinge epistemology (RR) is presented.
• RR effectively dissolves closure-based radical skeptical problems, a key attraction of hinge epistemology.
• RR demonstrates particular suitability for addressing complex social issues, functioning as a social hinge epistemology.

Conclusions:

• Radical relativist hinge epistemology offers a novel solution to long-standing skeptical challenges.
• The proposed framework provides valuable insights into understanding and addressing deep disagreement and various forms of injustice.
• This approach advances social epistemology by integrating relativist and non-evidentialist commitments.