Coevolutionary game dynamics with localized environmental resource feedback

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Ecological Dynamics
• Complex Systems

Background:

• Dynamic environments influence evolutionary game systems.
• Resource availability impacts individual competitiveness and survival.
• Environmental feedback loops are crucial in coevolutionary dynamics.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback using a prisoner's dilemma model.
• To explore the impact of spatial resource heterogeneity on game dynamics.
• To identify conditions that prevent the 'oscillatory tragedy of the commons'.

Main Methods:

• Introduction of spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game.
• Simulation of coevolutionary dynamics on square lattices.
• Analysis of environmental feedback between strategies and resource update rates.

Main Results:

• High influence of strategies on resource update rates in heterogeneous environments can lead to stable equilibrium.
• Self-organized clustered patterns emerge on lattices, enhancing system stability.
• The transition to equilibrium is robust across various parameters like cooperator strength, initial distribution, size, structure, and noise.

Conclusions:

• Spatial heterogeneity and strong strategy-resource feedback can avert the oscillatory tragedy of the commons.
• Clustered patterns in spatial evolutionary games promote system stability.
• The findings offer insights into maintaining cooperation and resource sustainability in dynamic environments.