Why do autocracies enfranchise their citizens abroad? A large-N event history analysis, 1990-2010

Autocratic ruling elites allow elections as a survival strategy. Many authoritarian regimes have taken this tactic one step further, also inviting their diaspora to vote from afar. This may seem puzzling given that elections abroad are difficult to control and provide a platform for exiled regime critics. So far, however, the reasons for autocracies to grant their diaspora voting rights have rarely been explored. In this article, we address this shortcoming. We employ a cross-national, autocratic regime dataset and a discrete-time event history model. We argue that autocracies use diaspora suffrage to repress and co-opt their citizens abroad while legitimizing their rule domestically and internationally. Autocrats are risk-averse and the decision to enfranchise hinges on the characteristics of the diaspora and the regime's need for legitimacy, repression and co-optation after power transitions. We substantiate these claims by demonstrating that autocrats are less likely to enfranchise a diaspora that largely resides in democracies or consists of refugees in democracies. In turn, successful coups render diaspora suffrage adoption more probable. In sum, external voting rights present a critical case to better understand why authoritarian states adopt democratic institutions and wish to connect with their internationally mobile population.