Infanticide and infant bodily rights

Some of the most widely accepted arguments in favour of abortion seem to undermine the view that infanticide is impermissible. In this paper, I outline a proposal that addresses this issue, arguing that the impermissibility of infanticide can be defended in a way that is consistent with traditional arguments in favour of abortion. I argue that killing an infant would violate its bodily rights, and so there are strong presumptive reasons against infanticide. I further argue that fetuses do not have bodily rights, and so these same reasons cannot be used to defend the impermissibility of abortion. To support this argument, I first suggest some ways in which killing someone requires violating their bodily rights. I then argue that bodily rights begin at birth, and so infants have bodily rights, but fetuses do not. When taken together with the traditional arguments in favour of abortion, this proposal suggests an important result in the abortion debate: there are philosophical grounds for defending both the permissibility of abortion and the impermissibility of infanticide.