'Synthetic' Embryonic Entities: What Really Matters in Legal Regulation?

Modern ethics and law understand the human embryo as a value deserving special protection. This protection is ensured by legal systems and until recently was based on a generally accepted understanding of what we mean by 'embryo'. With the technological innovations of the last decades, this perception has begun to be challenged, as new embryonic entities have been artificially created. These entities are not derived from a gamete union and may develop in a biologically similar way to the natural embryo, at least in their early stages. To what extent should these new biological forms be protected, given their similarities and differences with the latter? This article argues that from an ethical and legal point of view, the sole criterion justifying the protection of the human embryo is its potential to fully develop into a complete organism. It is on the basis of this criterion that we should assess the protection of 'synthetic' embryonic entities and proceed to adopt specific regulations for their treatment, particularly in research.