Why Nonidentity Is Not a Problem: Parfitian Defence of Clinicians Refusing to Provide Assisted Reproductive...

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Reproductive Ethics
• Philosophy of Medicine

Background:

• Current reproductive rights literature often dismisses future child welfare in assisted reproductive technology (ART) provision.
• This dismissal is frequently based on a narrow interpretation of the philosophical "non-identity" problem.
• The "non-identity" problem suggests future individuals have an overriding interest in being born, irrespective of their quality of life.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the accepted argument that child welfare is irrelevant in ART provision.
• To propose a more comprehensive interpretation of the "non-identity" problem that supports considering child welfare.
• To develop ethical arguments for the moral defensibility of delaying or denying ART in specific circumstances.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of the "non-identity" problem and its application to reproductive ethics.
• Formulation of Parfit-style arguments to justify clinician refusal of ART.
• Critique of the selective application of the "person-affecting" harm principle in reproductive contexts.

Main Results:

• The paper argues that a broader understanding of the "non-identity" problem supports the relevance of child welfare in ART.
• Four Parfit-style arguments are presented, demonstrating instances where denying ART is ethically justifiable.
• The study refutes the notion that the sole interest of a future child is merely to be born.

Conclusions:

• Dismissing child welfare concerns in ART provision is ethically problematic under a robust interpretation of the "non-identity" problem.
• Clinician refusal of ART treatment can be morally defended in certain cases, aligning with the "non-identity" problem paradigm.
• This work advocates for a more nuanced ethical framework in ART decision-making that incorporates the welfare of future children.