Abstract
When someone gets in legal trouble in America, their case is almost invariably decided by a lawyer (a judge), lay people (a jury), or a combination of the two. Professional discipline, however, is a giant unexplained exception. In professional discipline matters, accusations of dangerous or incompetent practice are decided, usually in the first instance but always in the last, by state licensing boards composed of other members of the accused's profession. These licensing boards wield immense power as labor regulatory institutions, covering ten times as many American workers as the minimum wage and more workers than private and public sector unions combined.Given how unusual this setup is, there has been surprisingly little study of professional discipline within any academic field-and virtually none within law. This inattention is troubling not only because of professional discipline's immense footprint, but also because of the potential for widespread social harm. That potential is most obvious in health care, which accounts for approximately two-thirds of licensed professionals. But even in professions outside of health care, like engineering and accountancy, unethical or incompetent practice can cause wide-spread social harm. The decision-makers controlling whether bad actors can continue to practice have no experience in policy, regulation, or adjudication. They are playing lawyers without really knowing how.This article is the first comprehensive assessment of professional discipline's regulatory design. It argues that the busy volunteer professionals who handle disciplinary matters lack the regulatory expertise, training, and standards necessary to ensure public safety and provider competence. Fortunately, other jurisdictions offer promising models for reform. We compare the American system to that in the United Kingdom, which demands more legal expertise, decision guidance, and non-professional perspectives. To add rigor to the comparison, we provide two new hand-coded datasets-one from a US state and one for the UK, showing that disciplinary outcomes are more appropriately harsh in the UK. We argue, in conclusion, that a similar model in the United States would be promising step forward.
