A dualist theory of experience

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Neuroscience
• Metaphysics

Background:

• Dualism posits that mental experiences arise from physical states but are not identical to or grounded in them.
• Existing dualist theories often struggle to meet stringent criteria for a complete theory of experience.
• The causal closure of the physical domain presents a significant challenge for dualist accounts.

Purpose of the Study:

• To establish a rigorous set of constraints for constructing a viable dualist theory of experience.
• To critically evaluate existing dualist theories against these constraints.
• To propose and develop a novel dualist theory that satisfies all proposed constraints.

Main Methods:

• Formulating five key constraints for dualist theories: experiences as causes, no violation of physical causal closure, avoiding overdetermination, specifying psychophysical laws, and preserving phenomenology under functional duplication.
• Analyzing prominent dualist theories to assess their adherence to these constraints.
• Constructing a new dualist framework, termed 'delegatory dualism,' designed to meet all criteria.

Main Results:

• Existing dualist theories partially satisfy the proposed constraints but fall short of a comprehensive account.
• Delegatory dualism is presented as a theoretical framework that successfully meets all five stringent constraints.
• This new theory posits that physical states delegate causal responsibilities to mental experiences.

Conclusions:

• A robust dualist theory of experience must satisfy specific causal and nomological conditions.
• Delegatory dualism offers a promising resolution to long-standing challenges in the philosophy of mind and consciousness.
• The theory provides a novel perspective on how mental states can be causally efficacious without disrupting the physical world.