Practical security analysis and attack strategies on permutation functions used in IoT supply chain systems

Area of Science:

• Computer Science
• Cryptography
• Internet of Things (IoT) Security

Background:

• The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices necessitates low-cost security solutions.
• Ultra-lightweight authentication protocols using simple operators (XOR, Shift) are explored for minimal hardware complexity.
• Permutation functions are key components in these lightweight protocols.

Purpose of the Study:

• To highlight the critical role of internal structure in permutation functions for system security.
• To analyze the security vulnerabilities of the ULBRAP protocol for supply chain management.
• To propose solutions for identified weaknesses in permutation functions.

Main Methods:

• Examined the internal structure of permutation functions within ultra-lightweight authentication protocols.
• Performed security analysis on the ULBRAP protocol, identifying vulnerabilities.
• Demonstrated attacks (secret disclosure, traceability) on Raspberry Pi devices.
• Quantified the computational cost of the attack (1,710,947 hash calculations, ~5 minutes).

Main Results:

• Structural weaknesses in permutation functions can undermine the security of otherwise efficient protocols.
• The ULBRAP protocol is vulnerable to secret disclosure and traceability attacks.
• Attacks were successfully demonstrated with practical computational requirements.

Conclusions:

• The internal design of permutation functions is paramount for robust IoT security.
• Flaws in permutation functions can lead to significant security breaches in authentication protocols.
• Addressing structural weaknesses is essential for developing secure and reliable ultra-lightweight systems.