Stoicism, mindfulness, and the brain: the empirical foundations of second-order desires

Building on the Stoic notion of self-regulation, we explore philosophical conceptualizations in relation to empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience. We challenge the mainstream account that dismisses the possibility of free will based on contemporary scientific findings. Instead, we argue that these findings actually support and refine the Stoic view of free will, particularly in terms of diachronic self-regulation through second-order willed actions over time. Contrary to classical interpretations of Libet-type experiments-which are often cited to refute free will-we contend that such evidence undermines the notion that we are passive recipients of spontaneous desires. Rather, we possess the capacity to regulate our actions proactively by cultivating and exercising deliberate, voluntary intentions. Freedom, in this sense, arises from a meta-cognitive ability or hierarchical, second-order will that can causally influence or override first-order desires or impulsive habits. In essence, our choices are not entirely predetermined by our upbringing or external circumstances; they emerge from our capacity to reflect upon and respond to those influences. Through this process, the self becomes a self-determined free agent.