The study of the random evolutionary game model and policy effects of carbon information disclosure by Chinese listed...

As global attention to environmental sustainability increases, corporate environmental information disclosure has become a key driver of environmental governance. Based on public choice theory, this paper constructs a random evolutionary game model for environmental information disclosure by Chinese listed companies, analyzing the interactions and policy effects of the government, enterprises, and the public in the disclosure process. Public choice theory emphasizes that the behavior of the government, enterprises, and the public is driven by self-interest, and that their interactions through the game process determine the transparency of environmental information. In the model, the government incentivizes companies to disclose environmental information through subsidy and penalty policies, while companies decide whether to disclose environmental data based on cost-benefit analysis and public pressure. The public influences corporate decisions through monitoring behaviors, thereby promoting information disclosure. The study finds that penalty mechanisms are more effective than subsidies in encouraging high-quality information disclosure by companies. However, excessive subsidies may reduce public participation, leading to a counterproductive effect. Subsidy strategies need to be carefully calibrated to avoid negative consequences. Through numerical simulations, the paper verifies the stability of the model and explores the impact of policy parameters on environmental information disclosure. Moderate public participation can effectively complement government regulation and promote high-quality information disclosure by companies. This study provides policy recommendations for policymakers to optimize strategies, aiming to enhance the transparency of corporate environmental information disclosure and offering theoretical support for future environmental governance.