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Deep learning-based profiling side-channel attacks in SPECK cipher.
Faisal Hameed1,2, Hoda Alkhzaimi3,4
1Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, New York, USA. fah276@nyu.edu.
This study presents a new deep learning method for profiling side-channel attacks on the SPECK cipher. The technique successfully recovered the SPECK-32/64 key using minimal data, enhancing IoT security.
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Area of Science:
- Cryptography
- Computer Science
- Machine Learning
Background:
- Deep learning profiling side-channel analysis is advancing, particularly for classical ciphers like AES.
- Adaptation of these advanced techniques to lightweight cryptography, such as the SPECK cipher, is underexplored.
- SPECK is crucial for Internet of Things (IoT) devices, necessitating strong defenses against side-channel attacks.
Purpose of the Study:
- To introduce a novel deep learning-based profiling side-channel analysis for the SPECK lightweight cipher.
- To address the gap in research applying advanced deep learning attacks to lightweight primitives.
- To evaluate the effectiveness of deep learning ensemble methods against SPECK implementations.
Main Methods:
- Utilized a sequential divide and conquer ensemble of deep learning models.
- Applied the technique to software implementations of the SPECK-32/64 cipher.
- Focused on profiling side-channel analysis to recover the secret key.
Main Results:
- Successfully recovered the 8-byte secret key of the SPECK-32/64 cipher.
- Achieved key recovery in fewer than 250 traces, demonstrating high efficiency.
- This represents the first known deep learning-based profiling attack on both unprotected and protected SPECK implementations.
Conclusions:
- Deep learning ensemble methods are effective for profiling side-channel attacks on lightweight ciphers like SPECK.
- The proposed method offers a significant advancement in securing resource-constrained devices in IoT.
- Further research is warranted to explore these techniques on other lightweight cryptographic primitives.