Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction.

Area of Science:

• Game Theory
• Information Economics
• Auction Theory

Background:

• Information design games involve strategic information revelation.
• All-pay auctions are common economic mechanisms with competitive bidding.

Purpose of the Study:

• Establish a formal mapping between information design games and all-pay auctions.
• Utilize this mapping to derive equilibria in information design games.
• Analyze the impact of tie-breaking rules on auction outcomes.

Main Methods:

• Formal mathematical modeling.
• Characterization of a game-theoretic mapping.
• Comparative statics analysis.

Main Results:

• A direct correspondence between information design games and all-pay auctions is established.
• The mapping facilitates equilibrium computation in information design games.
• Tie-breaking rules significantly influence posterior distributions and receiver payoffs.

Conclusions:

• The established mapping provides a powerful tool for analyzing information design games.
• The findings offer insights into the strategic implications of tie-breaking rules in auctions.
• This research bridges two distinct fields within economic theory.