An evolutionary game model of HEI and graduate aligning postgraduate expansion with sustainable development

This study employs an evolutionary game model to investigate the strategic dynamics between higher education institutions (HEIs) and bachelor's degree graduates (Graduates) amid China's postgraduate enrollment expansion and its concurrent employment challenges. We construct a model around these two stakeholders and propose two novel parameters to quantify their decision drivers: the Education Opportunity Cost Premium (EOCP) for graduates and the Return on an expansion policy (RREP) for HEIs. The findings reveal a bistable system with two potential equilibria: a "conservative coordination" (Not Expand, Employ) and a "progressive coordination" (Expand, Enroll). The system exhibits significant path dependency, indicating that the final outcome is highly sensitive to initial conditions. Graduates' strategies are primarily driven by the EOCP, while institutional choices are governed by the RREP. This research elucidates how individually rational decisions can converge towards a collectively suboptimal outcome, posing a challenge to sustainable development. By analyzing the model's sensitivity to key parameters, this study critically assesses the implications for educational equity and proposes a collaborative university-industry-government framework to better align postgraduate expansion with sustainable development goals.