Moral language and Moore's Paradox: Challenging moral expressivism

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Language
• Moral Psychology
• Experimental Ethics

Background:

• Moore's Paradox highlights infelicity in logically consistent statements (e.g., 'It's raining but I don't think it's raining').
• Moral expressivism posits moral assertions express non-cognitive attitudes, akin to beliefs expressed by descriptive statements (Parity Thesis).

Purpose of the Study:

• To extend Moore's Paradox to moral discourse and empirically test the Parity Thesis.
• Investigate intuitions surrounding moral statements like 'Murder is wrong but I don't disapprove of it.'

Main Methods:

• A pre-registered study with 1200 participants used a mixed design.
• Manipulated moral term type (thick/thin), evaluative polarity (positive/negative), perspective (first/third person), and attitude (belief/disapproval).

Main Results:

• Participants found it largely acceptable to state an action is wrong without disapproving of it.
• Moral statements showed similarities to Moorean Paradoxes but with key differences.

Conclusions:

• The infelicity of Moorean Paradoxes is central to the paradox and the Parity Thesis.
• Empirical findings suggest moral language does not express approval/disapproval in the same way declarative language expresses beliefs.