Organized criminal violence and leadership decapitation in Latin America's drug wars

This study examines the effects of arresting or killing leaders of organized criminal groups (OCGs) on drug market violence in six Latin American countries. It is the first cross-national study of leadership decapitations, and the first to include both state-perpetrated and OCG-perpetrated decapitations as independent variables.

Leadership removals and drug market violence were identified using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED). The three outcome variables are: (1) inter-OCG battle deaths, (2) battle deaths from armed confrontations between state forces and OCGs, and (3) a combined measure of the two. I estimate the effects of leadership decapitations using a series of linear regressions with two-way fixed effects. The panel dataset includes Mexican, Venezuelan, and Brazilian states, and departments in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (N = 136), measured monthly between 2022 and 2024.

The main models and several robustness checks show that state-perpetrated decapitations are most consistently associated with an increase in state-OCG battle deaths. In contrast, OCG-perpetrated decapitations are associated with an increase in inter-OCG battle deaths. In both cases, effects tend to diminish within a few months of the decapitation.

OCG-perpetrated decapitations likely trigger violent contestation over the drug trade between and within OCGs. However, state decapitations likely trigger violence through other mechanisms, including the state's intent to incapacitate target OCGs, and the latter attempting to send costly signals of strength to rivals by attacking state forces. Implications for policy and future research are discussed.