On the Design of Optimal Consensus With Deception-Eliminating Scheme and Asynchronous Updates

Area of Science:

• Control Systems Engineering
• Game Theory
• Network Security

Background:

• Asynchronous optimal consensus control is vulnerable to false information attacks from deceptive agents.
• Maintaining data integrity and achieving consensus in decentralized systems with unreliable nodes is challenging.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a deception-eliminating design (DED) to counteract false information in asynchronous optimal consensus control.
• To ensure reliable state information transmission and guarantee consensus despite deceptive agents.

Main Methods:

• Modeling agent interactions as multistage games with a Tit-for-Tat rule.
• Designing a false information counterattack rule using matrix properties and convex forms.
• Theoretical analysis using Riccati differential equations, integrating factor methods, and Minkowski inequality.

Main Results:

• The Tit-for-Tat rule compels deceptive agents to transmit true state information.
• The counterattack rule prevents cooperative agents from reverting to deception.
• An explicit upper bound for strategy update periods was derived, ensuring asynchronous consensus.

Conclusions:

• The proposed DED effectively eliminates deception in asynchronous optimal consensus control.
• Adherence to the calculated update period bound guarantees system consensus.
• This research provides a robust framework for secure decentralized control systems.