Hallucinations at the interface of philosophy and the empirical sciences

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Psychology

Background:

• Hallucinations are studied differently in philosophy (subjectively indistinguishable experiences) and empirical sciences (clinically embedded phenomena).
• This divergence leads to a conceptual misalignment in understanding hallucinations.
• Existing empirical models (bottom-up, top-down, predictive processing) offer partial explanations.

Purpose of the Study:

• To diagnose the conceptual misalignment between philosophical and scientific approaches to hallucinations.
• To offer a preliminary framework for conceptual analysis to narrow this divergence.
• To clarify key distinctions relevant to the study of hallucinations.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of key distinctions: indistinguishability, insight, sense of reality, agency, and ownership.
• Examination of leading empirical models of hallucinations.
• Re-situation of hallucinations within philosophical debates on perception, mental imagery, and phenomenology.
• Assessment of interdisciplinary developments challenging unitary models.

Main Results:

• Identified a conceptual misalignment between philosophical and scientific approaches to hallucinations.
• Clarified key distinctions and their relevance to empirical and philosophical frameworks.
• Empirical findings both inform and complicate current philosophical accounts of perception.
• Interdisciplinary developments support pluralist, integrative approaches over unitary models.

Conclusions:

• Hallucinations should be viewed as a family of related phenomena, not a single entity.
• The analysis provides theoretical coordinates for improved interdisciplinary collaboration.
• An integrated framework is proposed to bridge philosophical and scientific perspectives on hallucinations.