[Scientific research regarding the dual use research concern : emergence and current topic of the concept]

The increase in knowledge in the life sciences in recent decades has given rise to developments that are likely to offer unprecedented opportunities for improving the living conditions of man and his environment. Knowledge and know-how in biology and biotechnology and their access facilitated by the generalization of information systems accessible to the greatest number of people are disrupting many behaviors and ways of thinking. This raises ethical and societal questions that relate in particular to the appropriateness of risk assessment in the conduct of certain research due to either the "misuse" that could result from it, or because of a possible major impact on public health or the environment. Among these risks, the proliferation of biological weapons or bioterrorism represents biosecurity and biosafety issues that are today a real current concern. The same applies to the possible consequences of incidents or accidents that may occur during the handling of pathogenic microorganisms or particularly dangerous viruses. In the early 2000s, Professor Henri Korn, within the framework of a working group of the French Academy of Sciences, has undertaken to deepen these questions and to take an interest in raising the awareness of scientists of what is known under the generic term dual use research concern (DURC). He was managing a working group on this topic and published a report in 2008, entitled "Biological threats, biosafety and the responsibility of scientists on research". In 2015, taking into account this report, the government authorities have established by decree a National Advisory Council for Biosafety (CNCB), and have entrusted its coordination jointly to the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security (SGDSN) and the French Academy of Sciences. Since 2015, the CNCB has been asked to consider several issues, including a report on dual use research of concern, published in 2019. More recently, the CNCB has focused on biological laboratory incidents and accidents. These reports were the subject of recommendations, in particular concerning initial and continuing training in "the assessment of the risks of duality in research" and the support of legitimate dual use research.