Consciousness and the measurement problem

This paper examines two approaches to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, invoking the concept of consciousness and highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each. The first approach is the model proposed by David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen, based on the idea of the Consciousness Collapses Wave Function (CCWF), originally attributed to John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner. The second approach is the phenomenological framework known as the London-Bauer-French (LBF) approach. We contend that significant challenges have been raised against key features of the CCWF model. However, these criticisms require further arguments to effectively undermine its most crucial claim: that the model can be tested to determine whether consciousness collapses the wave function. We will demonstrate that while CCWF offers a mathematically defined collapse mechanism that yields straightforward, experimentally testable predictions about collapse per se, these tests do not, by themselves, establish that consciousness is the cause of collapse. Nevertheless, despite this limitation, their model provides conceptual clarity in addressing the measurement problem, as it utilizes a mathematically defined collapse mechanism that offers a straightforward and testable solution. In contrast, the LBF approach lacks conceptual clarity regarding the measurement problem, as it continues to depend on the standard quantum formalism.