Cognitive mechanisms underlying sense of agency: Meta-analytic reviews of behavioral and neuroimaging studies

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling one's own actions, and, through them, events in the outside world. Contrasting cognitive theories emphasize either the importance of motor predictions or of retrospective inference in this ubiquitous experience. Temporal binding refers to the subjective compression of the time interval between voluntary actions and their outcomes and offers a reliable, quantitative measure of sense of agency. A rotating clock hand has been used to allow participants to indicate the perceived time of actions or outcomes. The perceived time of an action is shifted later if the action produces an outcome, compared to a baseline condition without an outcome (action binding). The perceived time of the outcome event is shifted earlier if it is caused by an action, compared to a baseline condition where the outcome occurs with no action (outcome binding). We report a meta-analysis of 75 published studies of action binding and outcome binding. Action binding showed a modest effect size that was increased for more volitional actions compared to less volitional control conditions. Outcome binding showed a large effect size that again depended on volition but also depended on other moderating factors such as outcome sensory modality, outcome valence, and action-outcome delay. A separate activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis of 48 neuroimaging studies that used a range of different measures of agency, but not temporal binding, could identify neural networks corresponding to these moderating factors. The cerebellum, presupplementary motor area, and premotor cortex formed a volition-sensitive motor network, potentially mediating both action binding and outcome binding. Wider networks associated with effects of valence (caudate and putamen) and temporal delay integration nodes (temporoparietal junction) could be linked to strength of outcome binding only. These findings provide a novel neurocognitive framework explaining how dissociable components of temporal binding reflect both motor-specific and nonmotoric cognitive processes. These processes together produce the coherent experience of agency that accompanies a vast range of human actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).