Compounds and Raiders: A Strategic Model of Self-Protection in the End Times

Area of Science:

• Socioeconomics
• Political Science
• Game Theory

Background:

• Societal collapse scenarios prompt survivalist behaviors, including elite bunker building.
• This phenomenon, termed 'prepping,' can be viewed as self-insurance against existential threats.
• Such strategies often involve a transactional view of human interaction and defense.

Purpose of the Study:

• To examine the rationality of elite bunker building in response to anticipated societal collapse.
• To analyze the interplay between fortification strategies, internal control, and external hostility.
• To introduce a quantitative measure of hostility and its impact on defense investments.

Main Methods:

• Economic decision modeling applied to survival scenarios.
• Analysis of factors like internal control, resentment, and perceived external threats.
• Introduction and application of a 'Machiavelli index' to quantify hostility.

Main Results:

• Excessive investment in defense (bunkerization) can be counterproductive, potentially provoking attacks.
• Maximum fortification is not necessarily the optimal survival strategy.
• Factors such as cooperation, redistribution, and reducing inequality can be more effective.

Conclusions:

• Survival during societal collapse may depend more on social factors like legitimacy and reciprocity than on physical defenses.
• Strategic restraint and fostering cooperation can be more beneficial than isolation and excessive fortification.
• The rationality of elite bunker building is questioned; alternative strategies focusing on social cohesion are proposed.