Teleological Properties of Operant Behavior

In this article we investigate the teleological properties (functions and goals) of behavioral patterns, with emphasis on operant behaviors, including those associated with creativity and behavioral novelty. We integrate the etiological theory of teleology (as developed by Larry Wright, Ruth G. Millikan, James Garson, and others) with key concepts from behavior analysis. Although the language of functions and goals has traditionally faced resistance within behavior analysis, mainly due to concerns about causal confusion, we argue that such language is conceptually valuable when situated within the framework of selection by consequences. In the first part of the article, we disentangle teleological discourse from common misconceptions, particularly worries about reverse causation and the obstruction of causal explanation, drawing on insights from Larry Wright and others. In doing so, we set out what teleological concepts do not imply, while also identifying their core semantic features, such as the contrast between functions or purposes and mere accidents. In the second part, we develop an etiological interpretation of the teleological properties of behavioral patterns which, besides harmonious with the semantic core of teleological concepts, has theoretical synergies with behavior-analytic understanding of operant behavior, thus avoiding mentalistic aspects of some previous etiological readings of complex action. Our approach integrates Skinner's interpretation of selection processes with recent advancements in behavior analysis, including theories of operant generativity, behavioral variability, and relational frames. Finally, we conclude by setting our approach in contrast with two influential theories of teleology, in a way that brings into view its potential advantages.