Doxastic Precautionary Principle as Political Encroachment

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Legal and Political Philosophy
• Ethics of Belief

Background:

• Two key ethics of belief positions, epistemic purism and reason pragmatism, present conflicting intuitions, particularly regarding all-things-considered beliefs.
• These conflicts manifest in meta-principles governing law and policy: evidence-based regulation and the precautionary principle.
• Evidence-based regulation mandates legal rules based on current scientific knowledge, while the precautionary principle advocates for regulation despite insufficient scientific evidence of potential harm.

Purpose of the Study:

• To reconcile the seemingly conflicting principles of evidence-based regulation and the precautionary principle.
• To re-examine the precautionary principle through the lens of ethics of belief.
• To demonstrate how the precautionary principle can be interpreted to align with, rather than oppose, evidence-based regulation.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of ethical theories of belief.
• Examination of meta-principles in law and policy-making.
• Reinterpretation of the precautionary principle within the framework of epistemic ethics.

Main Results:

• The precautionary principle can be viewed as a political encroachment on evidence-based regulation when interpreted through certain ethical frameworks.
• A novel interpretation reconciles the epistemic and pragmatic intuitions underlying both principles.
• The study proposes a way to harmonize scientific evidence requirements with protective measures against potential harm.

Conclusions:

• The precautionary principle, when understood through the ethics of belief, can be reconciled with evidence-based regulation.
• This reconciliation addresses conflicts in both theoretical ethics and practical policy-making.
• The findings offer a framework for more coherent and ethically grounded legal and policy decisions.