What Should We Believe? The Case of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates

The assumption that the justifiability of scientific belief depends exclusively on the relevant facts is a widely accepted orthodoxy both inside and outside of the scientific establishment. Drawing on the pragmatic and moral encroachment thesis in epistemology, this article challenges that assumption by showing that practical and moral considerations affect the justifiability of our beliefs regarding the safety of COVID-19 vaccines. In particular, I show that a proper consideration of the practical and moral costs of committing to the belief that COVID-19 vaccines are safe enough for a general vaccine mandate requires COVID-19 vaccines to meet a higher-than-current evidentiary standard of safety. Furthermore, I show that a reassessment of existing COVID-19 vaccines against a higher evidentiary standard of safety would entail a wider scope of medical exemptions and remedial duties. Beyond the case of COVID-19 vaccines, this argument has important general implications for how scientific beliefs should be assessed.