Information structure in clinical reasoning

Clinical reasoning in diagnosis is often described using dual-process theory (DPT), which distinguishes between intuitive and analytical modes of thinking. In contemporary clinical practice, however, differences in diagnostic performance are not always explained solely by cognitive mode. This paper examines how the structure of diagnostic information, specifically whether information is held in a more integrated or more modular form, is related to how dual process reasoning is expressed in practice. Information structure is considered within the situational context through which clinicians assemble, interpret, and use clinical data as cases unfold. Building on work in cognitive psychology, human factors, and systems design, the analysis describes how variations in information structure interact with intuitive and analytical processing during clinical work. This focus helps account for why clinicians may reason differently as a case evolves, how reframing information can alter the speed and flexibility of judgment, and how vulnerability to bias may vary across situations. Focusing on how information is structured underscores implications for safety and education by supporting reflection on reasoning approaches, alignment between task demands and cognitive processes, and adaptive shifts as clinical situations change.