Evolutionary game model for public health emergency management in universities

Public health crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, demand effective emergency management within universities, involving collaboration among university departments, students, and Public opinion channel. This study aims to construct and simulate a tripartite evolutionary game model capturing the dynamic strategic interactions of these stakeholders during crises. Utilizing an evolutionary game theory model, the study examines their decision-making behaviors under bounded rationality and incomplete information. Vensim software simulations reveal key findings: (1) moderate government penalties effectively encourage timely information disclosure by university departments; (2) reducing the costs of student complaints influences media verification behaviors; and (3) addressing students' optimistic biases significantly impacts strategic decision-making across all parties. These insights provide actionable recommendations for universities, including fostering collaborative governance, improving emergency response mechanisms, and enhancing stakeholder communication. This research contributes to the theoretical understanding of stakeholder dynamics and offers practical strategies to enhance the emergency management efficiency of higher education institutions during public health crises.