The Wrong Motives for Potentially Harming a Being

I aim to make progress on the following question: When is it morally wrong to risk harming another being? I will pay special attention to the use of the roundworm Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans), but my points are relevant to other situations and beings. I focus on the motive or purpose for exposing a being to risk of harm. I argue that it is morally wrong to potentially harm a being for the sake of others' positive well-being or for a purported good such as knowledge (that is, knowledge for its own sake). The practical ramifications include that there is a moral hurdle of justification for potentially harming another being, and the justification cannot be others' positive well-being or a good such as knowledge. Essentially, if the use of a being can be morally justified, it needs to be justified based on reducing enough ill-being or unpleasantness. One should recognise the creation and use of beings as a moral issue and view any warranted potential harm as a regrettable lesser evil. If feasible, it is desirable to use alternative methods that carry less risk and do not involve potentially sentient beings.