Informal state influence in international organizations: examining the link between executive head nationality and...

This article examines whether and how donor states engage differentially with earmarked funding within the multilateral system when their nationals hold executive office in international organizations (IOs). The article relies on recent scholarship on multilateral finance and IO bureaucracies to identify executive representation and earmarked funding as tools that states may use for exerting influence within IOs. Based on that, the article expects donors to both allocate smaller earmarked contributions for individual IO activities and to earmark their contributions less stringently when their nationals run IOs, while increasing the total volume of earmarked funding they provide to IOs. Using data from over 110,000 multilateral activities implemented by 49 IOs (1990-2020), our analyses suggest that, when their nationals run IO-executive offices, donors increase the overall (yearly) volume of earmarked funding they provide to IOs while decreasing the size of their individual earmarked contributions for IO activities, and their contributions tend to be also more stringently earmarked. The findings also suggest that donor considerations towards earmarked funding may be shaped by the tenure of executive heads. These findings have important implications for IO scholars, policymakers and stakeholders.