Dying with dignity, but what is dignity?

Within moral and legal philosophy, this essay critically examines the concept of dignity in the debate on euthanasia, starting from its intrinsically ambiguous and contested character. Through a conceptual and historical analysis, it argues that "dignity" is not a univocal concept, but rather one marked by ongoing disputes about its meaning, allowing for multiple conceptions with divergent normative implications. The text reconstructs relevant philosophical traditions, from Cicero to Kant and Waldron, in order to situate the relationship between dignity and autonomy as its central argumentative axis, recovering the latter as one of its most plausible foundations. On this basis, the essay contends that paternalistic interventions that restrict individual decisions in the name of dignity are conceptually problematic. Accordingly, a conception of dignity grounded in autonomy provides a normative basis for euthanasia, understood as the expression of an autonomous decision regarding one's own death.