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Delay-Doppler Domain Time-Hopping Key Generation and Security Analysis for Orthogonal Time Frequency Space Satellite
Wei Li1,2,3, Zhendie Bai1,2,3, Jikang Wang1,2,3
1Shanghai Satellite Network Research Institute Co., Ltd., Shanghai 201210, China.
None:
Physical-layer key generation (PLKG) is a technique that produces symmetric encryption keys by exploiting the inherent characteristics of wireless channels. It offers advantages including high physical-layer security, elimination of pre-shared keys, dynamic upgradability, and resistance to quantum attacks, making PLKG a promising security solution for next-generation (6G) networks. However, satellite communication channels exhibit high dynamics and long propagation delays. Characteristics such as large Doppler shifts, short coherence times, and orbital predictability pose severe challenges to PLKG, including reciprocity degradation, low key generation rate (KGR), and susceptibility to channel-prediction attacks. This work proposes a delay-Doppler domain time-hopping key generation scheme (KE-DD-TH) based on Orthogonal Time Frequency Space (OTFS) modulation for high-speed links between Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO)/Medium-Earth-Orbit (MEO) satellites and ground terminals in Ka/Ku bands. The scheme performs non-uniform sampling on the DD domain grid of OTFS symbols using an ephemeris-driven pseudo-random time-hopping sequence generated by cascaded linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and a nonlinear matrix transformation. Both legitimate parties estimate the channel only at time-hopping instants and multiply two adjacent estimates to construct an "equivalent channel" matrix, yielding a random source with high entropy, high reciprocity, and low predictability. The eavesdropper's key disagreement rate (KDR) remains close to 0.5 under all signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) conditions, corresponding to the ideal random-guessing baseline. This indicates that Eve obtains negligible mutual information, i.e., I(KA;KE)≈0. By contrast, the conventional KE-DD scheme allows Eve's KDR to degrade to 0.014 at 30 dB SNR, indicating near-complete key recovery. The generated keys pass all 12 randomness tests of the NIST SP 800-22 statistical test suite.
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